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The liquidity trap has become an issue of global concern. The economic downturn following
the ￿nancial turmoil that ￿rst began to emerge in 2007 has resulted in monetary policy
with virtually a zero lower bound on nominal interest rates simultaneously in a number
of countries, including Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. As a result,
many countries are attempting to stimulate aggregate demand and production via ￿scal
expansion.
In this paper, we theoretically investigate the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy in which two coun-
tries are caught simultaneously in a liquidity trap, and compare the results with that
under normal circumstances. Using a standard two-country sticky price model, we analyze
the ￿scal multiplier￿ the extent to which one country￿ s government expenditure increases
production in that country￿ and the ￿scal spillover￿ the extent to which one country￿ s
government expenditure boosts production in the other country. We examine whether
￿scal expansion yields a beggar-thy-neighbor situation.
According to textbook economics, ￿scal expansion under ￿ exible exchange rates is inef-
fective, because of the following mechanism (Dornbusch, Fisher, and Startz, 2008). In the
Mundell-Fleming model (Mundell, 1967), where the economy is characterized by ￿ exible
exchange rates, ￿xed domestic prices, and perfect capital mobility, ￿scal expansion builds
up upward pressure on interest rates in the home country. Subsequently, the exchange rate
appreciates. That o⁄sets the increase in demand for home-produced goods by crowding out
exports. Such conventional wisdom, however, may be overturned in a liquidity trap. This
is because in the liquidity trap, nominal interest rates are kept low despite ￿scal expansion.
Low interest rates prevent the exchange rate from appreciating. The economic activity in
the home country is thus stimulated rather than dampened.
Using a standard two-country sticky price model, we demonstrate that the size of
multipliers and the sign (positive or negative) associated with the spillover are contrary to
those predicted in textbook economics, without the zero lower bound, and under ￿ exible
price equilibrium. In a global liquidity trap, the ￿scal multiplier exceeds one. The country
with government expenditure ￿nds that its currency depreciates and its terms of trade
2worsen. That induces an increase in employment and therefore output. The ￿scal spillover
is negative if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption is less than one
and positive if the parameter is greater than one.
Incomplete stabilization of marginal costs due to the existence of the zero lower bound
is a crucial factor in understanding the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy in open economies. Thanks
to this, government spending in the home country raises the marginal costs of home-
produced goods, which increases expected in￿ ation rates and decreases real interest rates.
Intertemporal optimization causes consumption to increase, so that the ￿scal multiplier
exceeds one. While government spending continues, the price of home-produced goods
increases more than that of foreign-produced goods. Expecting that two countries are at
symmetric equilibrium when government spending ends, the home currency depreciates and
the home terms of trade worsen on impact when government spending begins. That shifts
demand for goods from foreign-produced goods to home-produced ones. The ￿scal spillover
thus may become negative depending on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in
consumption.
Re￿ ecting Japan￿ s experience around 2000 as well as the global ￿nancial crisis that
began in the summer of 2007, several studies analyze the role of ￿scal policy in a liquidity
trap. Christiano (2004) demonstrates that the ￿scal multiplier exceeds one in the presence
of the zero lower bound.1 A number of papers have examined his results using richer
frameworks with nonlinearity, di⁄erent monetary policy, and/or various shocks and policy
measures.2 Our model does not deal with some of their developments, but instead the
￿scal multiplier and spillover in a global liquidity trap, which have not been studied in the
1Regarding monetary policy, Fujiwara, Nakajima, Sudo, and Teranishi (2009) investigate the optimal
monetary policy when two countries are simultaneously caught in a liquidity trap in the form of a commit-
ment policy. For a closed economy model, see also Reifschneider and Williams (2000), Kato and Nishiyama
(2005), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Jung, Teranishi, and Watanabe (2005), Adam and Billi (2006,
2007), and Nakov (2008). For an extension to an open economy model, see Svensson (2001, 2003), Coenen
and Wieland (2003), and Nakajima (2008).
In relation to the ￿scal theory of the price level, see Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2002) and
Iwamura, Kudo, and Watanabe (2005).
2See Bodenstien, Erceg, and Guerrieri (2009), Braun (2009), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2009),
Eggertsson (2009), and Woodford (2010).
3previous literature.
Recently, Corsetti, Meier, and Muller (2009) and Freedman, Kumhof, Laxton, and
Lee (2009) evaluate the ￿scal multiplier and spillover in a similar context. Their analyses
suggest that a low interest rate environment is the key to yielding a greater ￿scal multiplier
and changing the sign associated with the ￿scal spillover. Their models are, however,
not strictly a model of a zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, and the method
of maintaining low interest rates seems controversial. For example, Corsetti, Meier, and
Muller (2009) establish a low interest rate environment by proposing a ￿scal expansion
policy that is followed by a reduction in spending over time. Our setup of considering a
low interest rate environment by means of the zero lower bound is natural, and the bound
is now realized. Moreover, while their analysis is numerical, we can show analytically the
degree of the ￿scal multiplier and the sign of the spillover. It helps us understand the
underlying mechanism and determine the sensitivity of our results to the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution in consumption.3
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces a standard two-country
sticky price model. In Section 3, we analyze the ￿scal multiplier and spillover without
the presence of the zero lower bound. In Section 4, we analyze the ￿scal multiplier and
spillover in the presence of the zero lower bound. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Model Setup
Our two-country sticky price model is a conventional one, similar to that used in Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler (2002), Benigno and Benigno (2003), and Fujiwara, Nakajima, Sudo, and
Teranishi (2009). The economy consists of a home country H and a foreign country F.
Labor is not mobile and it is used to produce a continuum of di⁄erentiated goods on the
unit intervals [0;1] in both countries.
3A number of empirical studies also exist regarding the international as well as the domestic transmission
of ￿scal shocks (e.g., Perotti (2007), Corsetti and Muller (2008), Kim and Roubini (2008), and Feyrer and
Shambaugh (2009)). In the international context, questions are related to whether we observe twin de￿cits:
budget de￿cits and current account de￿cits, and their empirical results are mixed.
4Regarding a representative household, consumption indices in both countries represent
bundles of di⁄erentiated home-produced goods and foreign-produced goods. We denote
the weight for the bundle of home-produced goods by n and for foreign-produced goods by
1￿n. We can use n to interpret as the relative size of the home country. The intratemporal
elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is one. Household preferences are
governed by factors common to the two countries: discount factor 0 < ￿t < 1, the inverse
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption ￿, and the Frisch elasticity
of labor supply !. The discount factor is stochastic and is the origin of the liquidity trap.
We call this natural rate shock.4
Regarding ￿rms, Y and Y ￿ represent the production of a good that is produced by
representative competing ￿rms in the home country and the foreign country, respectively.
An intermediate good is produced by a continuous number of monopolists using labor.
Each monopolist maximizes its pro￿ts subject to its demand curve and the Calvo-type
price friction where ￿ is the probability that the monopolist cannot reoptimize its price. We
assume producer currency pricing and the law of one price. We denote the aggregate price
(in￿ ation rate) of domestic goods and foreign goods as PH (￿H) and P￿
F (￿￿
F); respectively.
St represents a nominal exchange rate denoting the number of home currency units per
unit of foreign currency.
For monetary policy, following Christiano (2004), we assume that domestic and foreign
central banks conduct an optimal discretionary policy to stabilize in￿ ation. iH and iF
indicate nominal interest rates in the home country and in the foreign country, respectively.
Finally, for ￿scal policy, G represents government expenditure in the home country
and g_y represents the steady state ratio of government expenditure to output. The
government buys only domestic goods. It yields the deviation of the terms of trade from
its steady-state level.5
A detailed formulation is shown in the Appendix.
4Here, we are following Christiano (2004) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2009).
5For simplicity, we neglect government expenditure in the foreign country. Given symmetry, it is straight-
forward to analyze this, except for the size of home country n: The e⁄ect of government expenditure in
both countries can be analyzed easily, too, by summing the e⁄ect of government expenditure in the home
country and that in the foreign country, as long as the ￿rst-order approximation holds.
52.2 Linearized System of Equations
Using the above setup, we can derive the log-linearlized system of equations with respect
to the four variables of ^ Y , ^ Y ￿, ^ ￿H; and ^ ￿￿
F; as follows:
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The circum￿ ex (^) indicates the log-linearized deviation of the variable from its steady
state, with the exception of ^ Gt = (Gt ￿ G)=Y: The ￿rst two equations represent IS curves
with respect to domestic goods and foreign goods, respectively. Deducting ^ Gt from ^ Yt, the
IS curves indicate the Euler equations with respect to consumption. The last two equations
represent New Keynesian Phillips curves with respect to in￿ ation in the home country and
in the foreign country, respectively. Government spending in￿ uences the marginal costs of
domestic and foreign goods via the resource constraint and the labor market equilibrium
condition.
3 Fiscal Multiplier and Spillover under Normal Circumstances
We ￿rst consider a case in which neither central bank is constrained by the zero lower
bound of nominal interest rates. With producer currency pricing, there are only two kinds
of aggregate in￿ ation. Therefore, irrespective of the in￿ ation index to be targeted, two
policies in two countries are enough to stabilize in￿ ation in two countries.6 Further, as
6Note that CPI in￿ ation rates, namely in￿ ation rates based on the welfare based price index, are the
same in both countries. Under the complete international ￿nancial market and the settings of preferences in
this paper, there exists only one real interest rate. According to the Fisher equation, in￿ ation expectations
are also the same in both countries.
6shown by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002), and Benigno and Benigno (2003), since price
stability of producer prices is the optimal discretion and the commitment monetary policy,
central banks achieve zero in￿ ation in both countries.7 Under this optimal monetary policy,
marginal costs expressed in the ￿rst term of the right-hand side of the Phillips curves in
equations (3) and (4) become zero. Analysis in this section can be considered to use the
simple international real business cycle model without capital, namely the ￿ exible price
equilibrium.
As a result, the ￿scal multiplier associated with government spending in the home
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2 n(1 ￿ n)
:
Clearly, the ￿scal multiplier is lower than one. Compared to the ￿scal multiplier in a closed

















= ￿(￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ n)[1 + ! + (￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ 2n)]:
The two multipliers naturally become equal when n = 1; that is, when the relative size
of the home country is in￿nite. The inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
in consumption ￿ in￿ uences the relative size of the ￿scal multiplier to that in a closed
economy. When ￿ > 1; the ￿scal multiplier is smaller than it is in a closed economy. When
0 < ￿ < 1; the ￿scal multiplier becomes larger than that in a closed economy. When ￿ = 1;
as shown by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002), the two countries become insular. Hence,
the ￿scal multiplier equals that in a closed economy, irrespective of the size of n.
7The optimal targeting rule of the home central bank is static and does not contain any foreign variables.
This is because we do not include any distortionary shock, such as the cost-push shock examined in Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler (2002). Therefore, there is no trade-o⁄ in stabilizing between price and output.
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2 n(1 ￿ n)
:
The ￿scal spillover is positive if ￿ > 1 and negative if 0 < ￿ < 1: If ￿ = 1; the two countries
become insular and there is no spillover. Of course, there is no spillover in a closed economy
model.
The intuition behind this result can be understood as follows. The key is the e⁄ects










which is log-linearized as:
d ToTt =
^ Yt ￿ ^ Gt
1 ￿ g_y
￿ ^ Y ￿
t : (6)
Government spending directly increases production and employment in the home country.
That yields an upward pressure on home prices, and to prevent this, monetary policy is
tightened and real interest rates rise. Monetary tightening generates home exchange rate
appreciation and improves the terms of trade as shown in equation (5). As Clarida, Gali,
and Gertler (2002) and Fujiwara, Nakajima, Sudo, and Teranishi (2009) point out, the
terms of trade have two opposing e⁄ects on real marginal costs MCt. This is clear from













where ht and Ct represent is home employment and home consumption spent by a household











This equation implies that, ￿rst, by a⁄ecting output prices, the improvement in the terms
of trade directly decreases real marginal costs in the home country.8 On the other hand, it
8This is the terms of trade e⁄ects according to Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002).
8increases real marginal costs in the foreign country. To completely stabilize in￿ ation rates
so that real marginal costs become constant, home employment needs to increase while
foreign employment needs to decrease. Second, the improvement in the terms of trade
induces production switching from domestic to foreign goods. Given domestic output, that
requires a rise in output in the foreign country. Total consumption rises in both countries,
and due to risk sharing, both domestic and foreign consumption rise by the same amount.
The rise in domestic consumption raises real marginal costs in the home country, and to
o⁄set the rise in prices, home employment needs to decrease.9 Its size grows with ￿.
Consequently, if ￿ > 1; the ￿rst channel is dominated by the second channel. Home
employment decreases, which makes the ￿scal multiplier smaller than that in a closed
economy. Foreign employment increases, which yields positive ￿scal spillover. If 0 < ￿ < 1;
the ￿rst channel dominates the second channel. Home employment increases, which makes
the ￿scal multiplier larger than that in a closed economy. Foreign employment decreases,
which yields negative ￿scal spillover. If ￿ = 1; the two channels o⁄set each other. The
￿scal multiplier equals that in a closed economy and the ￿scal spillover becomes zero, since
the two countries are insular.10
It is worth noting that the implications for welfare are di⁄erent. Higher production
means higher employment. That has the e⁄ect of decreasing welfare, while because of
perfect risk sharing, consumption in the two countries is the same.11 Recall that, if ￿ > 1;
the ￿scal multiplier is lower and ￿scal spillover is higher compared with the case of a closed
economy. Therefore, if ￿ > 1; government spending produces superior social outcomes for
the country than would be seen in the case of a closed economy, because households in the
9This is the risk sharing e⁄ects according to Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002).
10The sensitivity to ￿ depends on the form of utility. For example, Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Hu⁄man











That function, not additively separable, abstracts the income e⁄ect on labor. Real marginal costs are
independent of ￿:
11Note that we do not assume any utility gain from government expenditure. For an analysis on the
optimal level of government expenditure with a small utility gain from it, see Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Rebelo (2009).
9foreign country work more to produce more goods. That leads to the beggar-thy-neighbor
problem. Also note that, as Tille (2001) and Benigno and Benigno (2003) point out, welfare
implications are highly dependent on other parameters, such as the intratemporal elasticity
of substitution between home and foreign goods, which in this paper is assumed to be 1.
Therefore, whether ￿ is larger or smaller than unity is crucial in the analyses of this paper.
4 Fiscal Multiplier and Spillover in a Global Liquidity Trap
We next consider a case in which the zero lower bound constrains central banks. The
central bank cannot achieve complete price stability because of the trade-o⁄ stemming
from the zero lower bound. We follow Christiano (2004) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Rebelo (2009). The natural rate shock ^ ￿t drops at periods t = 1;￿￿￿ ;T ￿1, and returns to
zero at period T. Central banks pursue optimal discretionary policy to stabilize in￿ ation.
For simplicity, we further assume that government spending in the home country Gt is
implemented for only two periods, at t = 1 and t = 2.12 Note that, in this paper, we do
not need to discern corporative and noncorporative cases because the natural rate shock
is common to both countries.
Using lag-operator L, we arrange equations (1) to (4). Since we assume that government
spending in the home country Gt is implemented for only two periods, at t = 1 and t = 2;
￿rst-order approximation up to L￿1 is su¢ cient. The ￿scal multiplier is approximated up
to the ￿rst order:
^ Yt = ￿
￿
1 + L￿1 +
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿
￿
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The coe¢ cients on ^ Gt and ^ Gt+1 represent the ￿scal multiplier. The above equation suggests
that completely temporary government spending ^ Gt has a multiplier of one. It already
12Extending the periods of government spending does not change our main results. Also for simplicity,
we focus on the ￿scal multiplier and spillover only on the initial date. We can compute those on the future
dates following Christiano (2004), but the analysis becomes less intuitive.
10exceeds the multiplier in the previous section. Government spending in the next period
^ Gt+1 has a multiplier of:
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿
fn + ￿ (1 ￿ n)g!
￿
:
Multi-period government spending increases the ￿scal multiplier. As ￿ falls, the ￿scal
multiplier becomes larger.
According to Christiano (2004), the ￿scal multiplier in a closed economy is 1 for ^ Gt:
A one-time government expenditure has a multiplier of the same amplitude. The ￿scal
multiplier in a closed economy for ^ Gt+1 is given by:





If ￿ > 1; the ￿scal multiplier in an open economy is larger than it is in a closed economy.
If 0 < ￿ < 1; the ￿scal multiplier is smaller than that in a closed economy. If ￿ = 1; the
￿scal multiplier equals that in a closed economy, since the two countries become insular.
Interestingly, the results here are quite contrary to those obtained in the previous section.
The ￿scal spillover is given by:
^ Y ￿
t = ￿
1 + L￿1 +
(1￿￿)(1￿￿￿)
￿ f1 + !(1 ￿ n + ￿n)=￿gL￿1
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The coe¢ cients on ^ Gt and ^ Gt+1 are zero and
￿





respectively. Completely temporary government spending ^ Gt has no spillover while gov-
ernment spending for the next period ^ Gt+1 has negative (positive) spillover if ￿ > (<)1.
If ￿ = 1; there is no spillover. As n rises, the absolute size of spillover tends to increase.
The signs of the spillover computed here are the opposite of those obtained under normal
circumstances.
Incomplete stabilization of marginal costs due to the existence of the zero lower bound
is a crucial factor in the high ￿scal multiplier. Government spending directly increases
11production and employment in the home country. That yields an upward pressure on
home prices. Because of the zero lower bound, in￿ ation rates and marginal costs are not
stabilized.13 They increase, and real interest rates drop. Intertemporal optimization causes
consumption to increase. That yields a greater ￿scal multiplier than that in the previous
section. The increase in consumption is larger as ￿ is lower.
The sign associated with ￿scal spillover is determined for the following reason. Gov-
ernment spending has two opposing e⁄ects. First, it shifts demand for goods from foreign-
produced goods to home-produced goods. When government spending ends, the terms
of trade are at equilibrium: the price of home-produced goods is as expensive as that of
foreign-produced goods. While government spending continues, the price of home-produced
goods increases more than that of foreign-produced goods. Therefore, when government
spending begins, the terms of trade worsen: home-produced goods are relatively cheaper
than foreign-produced goods. It increases demand for home-produced goods, and decreases
demand for foreign-produced goods. Second, the increase in expected in￿ ation rates lowers
real interest rates and increases demand for foreign-produced goods. The second e⁄ect be-
comes weaker, as the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption,
￿, becomes greater. If ￿ is greater (less) than one, the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates (is dominated
by) the second channel. Fiscal spillover becomes negative (positive).
More precise mechanism runs as follows. For completely temporary government spend-
ing, domestic production rises by the same amount while home consumption does not
change. Real marginal costs rise, which increases prices of home-produced goods on im-
pact. In the foreign economy, production and consumption do not change, so prices of
foreign-produced goods measured in the foreign currency do not change. The terms of
trade do not change because the currency of the home country depreciates on impact. The
fact that the nominal exchange rates change may seem contradictory with the uncovered
interest parity condition, given that nominal interest rates in both countries are bound at
13The importance of the ￿ uctuations in marginal costs on the ￿scal multiplier is also pointed out by Braun
(2009) and implicitly by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2009). If monetary policy is conducted
following the Taylor type rule and induces incomplete stabilization, multipliers become larger in this case
than under complete price stability.
12zero. Yet, it is not contradictory at all: the expected change in nominal exchange rates
remains unchanged. Also note that because the government spending is completely tempo-
rary, the expected in￿ ation rates in two countries do not change. That makes real interest
rates and consumption unchanged in both countries.
Consider a case in which there is government spending at t = 2 as well as at t = 1.
Backward induction addresses the underlying mechanism. The economy at t = 2 is close to
the economy when there is completely temporary government spending at t = 1. The terms
of trade are at equilibrium at t = 2. Prices of home-produced goods rise by ~ ￿H;2 while
prices of foreign-produced goods do not change. The only di⁄erence is in the nominal
exchange rates. From t = 1 to t = 2; nominal exchange rates do not move due to the
uncovered interest parity condition and the zero nominal interest rates in both countries.
It suggests that the terms of trade at t = 1 are positive by ~ ￿H;2 , meaning that the terms
of trade worsen at t = 1 for the home country. From equation (6), we have:
~ ￿H;2 =
^ Y1 ￿ ^ G1
1 ￿ g_y
￿ ^ Y ￿
1 : (8)
Worsening of the terms of trade increases home-produced goods but decreases foreign-
produced goods. On the other hand, because of a rise in the home-produced good at
t = 2, the aggregate in￿ ation rate in the home country rises by n~ ￿H;2, which lowers the
real interest rate by n~ ￿H;2 at t = 1. Due to intertemporal optimization, that increases




^ Y1 ￿ ^ G1
1 ￿ g_y
+ (1 ￿ n)^ Y ￿
1 : (9)
A decrease in the real interest rate increases both home-produced goods and foreign-
produced goods. Clearly, these two equations suggest that, for 0 < ￿ < 1; ^ Y ￿
1 increases,
while for ￿ > 1; ^ Y ￿
1 decreases.14 As ￿ is larger, the e⁄ect of the real interest rate on ^ Y ￿
1
becomes smaller. The increase in ^ Y ￿
1 is dominated by the decrease in ^ Y ￿
1 stemming from
the worsening (improvement) of the terms of trade for the home (foreign) country. The
￿scal spillover thus becomes negative for a large ￿.
14Regarding exchange rates, the validity of the uncovered interest parity condition has often been called
into question. Our results are, however, robust to the uncovered interest parity condition because there are
no interest rate di⁄erences between two countries.
13Regarding welfare, a lower ￿scal multiplier or higher spillover is better for the country
where the government spending takes place. Therefore, if ￿ > 1; government spending is
socially worse for the country with government spending than in a closed economy, since
households in the foreign country work less to produce less goods. It does not yield the
beggar-thy-neighbor problem, but ends up with beggar-thy-self.
The ￿ndings in this paper are summarized in Table 1. Numbers show the actual multi-
Table 1: Summary
Multiplier Spillover
0 < ￿ < 1 ￿ > 1 0 < ￿ < 1 ￿ > 1
Normal ^ Gt +, <1 (+) +, <1 (￿) ￿ (￿) + (+)
ZLB ^ Gt 1 (0) 1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
ZLB ^ Gt+1 + (￿) + (+) + (+) ￿ (￿)
plier or spillover. Signs inside brackets represent a comparison of the ￿scal multiplier and
spillover with those of a closed economy: + (-) implies that the multiplier or spillover is
larger (smaller) than in the closed economy. As equation (7) illustrates, incomplete stabi-
lization of marginal costs due to the existence of the zero lower bound is a crucial factor
in understanding the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy in open economies.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we ￿nd that ￿scal multiplier exceeds one in a global liquidity trap. The
reason for this is that re￿ ecting worsening terms of trade, employment and output must
increase in the country with government expenditure. On the other hand, the ￿scal spillover
is negative if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption is less than one
and positive if the parameter is greater than one. The size of the multiplier and the
sign (positive or negative) associated with the spillover are quite contrary to those in the
undergraduate textbook, those without the zero lower bound, and those under the ￿ exible
price equilibrium. Incomplete stabilization of marginal costs due to the existence of the
zero lower bound is crucial in understanding the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy in open economies.
14We have so far considered only symmetric cases. A further question could be, in a
situation where only the foreign country is constrained by the zero lower bound, how does
government expenditure in the home country in￿ uence the foreign country￿ s economy. Ac-
knowledging that there are many possible policies, such as noncorporative and corporative
policies, arising from di⁄ering objectives of two countries, we attempt to assume that a
central bank in the home country aims to stabilize the real marginal cost of the goods
produced in the home country. We ￿nd that the results are the mixture of those in the
two sections. The ￿scal multiplier is less than one for completely temporary government
spending. The ￿scal spillover is negative (positive) if ￿ > (<)1:
Another issue is how the government spending is used. A part of the government
spending may contribute directly to a household￿ s utility. Government spending may be
used to purchase not only home goods but also foreign goods. Local producer pricing
instead of producer currency pricing may alter our results. The validity of uncovered
interest parity becomes crucial when we consider asymmetric cases between two countries.
These issues will be addressed in future research.
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A Model
We describe the model only for the home country.
A.1 Household









subject to the budget constraint:
PtCt + Et (Qt;t+1Dt+1) + Bt+1 = Wtht + Dt + (1 + it￿1)Bt + ￿t ￿ T:















We assume a linear production function with labor as the only input:
Yt (j) = ht (j):
18The resource constraint is:
nYt (j) = nCH;t (j) + (1 ￿ n)C￿
H;t (j):
The preferences are set as





















We assume Calvo-type price setting. The price of domestic goods sold in the foreign
country is described simply as:
P￿
H;t =
PH;t
St
:
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